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A new perspective is provided on a puzzle that has emerged from the empirical lit-
erature suggesting that government-independent central banks provide a `free lunch':
lower in°ation is apparently achieved at no cost in terms of greater output variance.
We assess the various explanations provided by the theoretical literature. After revis-
iting the free lunch puzzle and con¯rming the empirical importance of open-economy
e®ects, we develop a Rogo®-style delegation model that combines the latter with po-
litical monetary cycle e®ects. We show that if all countries delegate monetary policy
to government independent banks, as economies become more integrated then a low
in°ation, higher output variance trade-o® re-emerges.
JEL Classi¯cation: C72, E61.
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This paper explains a stylized fact that has emerged from the empirical literature on central
bank independence and its e®ect on economic performance. Apparently, government-
independent central banks provide a free lunch; lower in°ation and lower in°ation variance
are achieved at no cost in terms of greater output or employment variance. This contrasts
with the prediction of Rogo® (1985b) that delegating monetary policy to an independent
and in°ation-averse central bank (CB) would result in lower average in°ation but at a cost
of an increase in the variances of output and employment. We provide a new perspective
on the reconciliation of this empirical puzzle with theory that stresses the open-economy
aspects of delegation.
The theoretical literature has explored a number of directions in order to understand
this result. Two explanations specify equilibria in which zero in°ation can be achieved
without compromising the e±cacy of stabilization policy in the face of shocks and consist
of a trigger strategy equilibrium, as in Barro and Gordon (1983), or a banker's contract,
as in Walsh (1995). Consider ¯rst the possibility of a trigger strategy equilibrium. Barro
and Gordon con¯ne themselves to the monetary policy game in the absence of shocks.
In a repeated game, a zero in°ation equilibrium can be sustained by a trigger strategy
on the part of the public which speci¯es in°ation expectations to be zero in the ¯rst
period and thereafter, if the history of play is zero in°ation. Otherwise they expect the
non-zero discretionary in°ationary bias for some length of time. Then provided that the
punishment period is su±ciently long and the discount rate su±ciently low, the CB will not
have an incentive to depart from zero in°ation. Even in the absence of the stabilization
dimension there are widely acknowledged problems with this proposed equilibrium; in
particular, what determines the length of the punishment period during which the private
sector expects high in°ation, and how can an atomistic private sector coordinate on one
particular strategy? Another problem is that even if the private sector could coordinate
then the punishment is not `recoordination-proof', and therefore not credible (al-Nowaihi
and Levine (1994)).
A seminal approach to the credibility problem pioneered by Walsh (1995) proposes
a contract that provides an incentive mechanism to eliminate the in°ation bias whilst
permitting the full use of stabilization policy. In terms of agency theory the principal (the
1government) designs an incentive mechanism consisting of an income transfer contingent
on in°ation such that the agent (the CB) will pursue the desired policy. But does the
Walsh contract in fact solve the credibility problem? What the contract certainly achieves
is the `relocation' of the problem as one of enforcing the contract (McCallum (1995)). The
problem still remains that circumstances will arise when it will be in the interests of all
concerned to renegotiate the contract rather than enforce it. This feature destroys the
credibility of the Walsh contract in the absence of some other enforcement mechanism.
For Walsh contracts to work some mechanism is required to make them renegotiation-
proof: for example institutional arrangements (implicitly assumed in Walsh (1995)) or
reputational e®ects (see al-Nowaihi and Levine, 2000). However, even if neither of these
devices exist and Walsh contracts do not eliminate the in°ationary bias, al-Nowaihi and
Levine (1998) point to another output variance-reducing role for contracts. Transparency
is the key to their result: by providing an e±cient signalling device to the electorate,
bankers' contracts can eliminate the political monetary cycle even with government-
dependent CBs. However, since Walsh contracts are not generally observed (New Zealand
is the exception), the signi¯cance of this literature is more normative than positive.
We turn therefore to two other explanations of the puzzle that retain Rogo®-delegation
of monetary policy to in°ation-averse `conservative' bankers, but modify Rogo®'s model to
include e®ects which o®set the higher output variance. In the partisan political monetary
cycle1 closed-economy model of Alesina and Gatti (AG, 1995) government-independent
conservative bankers engage in insu±cient stabilization policy which increases output vari-
ance, but this can be outweighed by the reduction in output variance caused by eliminating
political uncertainty. Currie et al. (CLP, 1996) examine the Rogo® delegation game in the
open economy and highlight the free-rider e®ect when few countries are able to choose con-
servative independent central banks in a world of predominantly government-dependent
CBs. It is possible that the empirical results are picking up this delegation disequilibrium
in which, faced with symmetric shocks, those countries who delegate ¯rst enjoy the bene¯t
1Partisan monetary cycles arise from a change in government and preferences over in°ation and output,
whereas the political monetary cycles in al-Nowaihi and Levine (1998) arise from desire of a government
to demonstrate its competence, or conceal its incompetence in the period before an election. Central bank
independence has the e®ect of eliminating both forms of cycle and the analysis of this paper could equally
be carried out using either.
2of low average in°ation whilst free-riding on other countries' monetary expansion.2
This paper presents a game of Rogo®-delegation modi¯ed to include both political
business cycles, as in AG, and the open-economy e®ects of CLP. Before developing the
theory, section 2 sets out the empirical motivation: ¯rst, the free lunch puzzle is con¯rmed.
Second, we build on other studies to show the empirical support for an openness e®ect on
the in°ationary bias. Section 3 then sets out a Mundell-Fleming form of multi-country
model with monetary policy conducted in terms of realized in°ation targets, and ¯scal
policy consisting of ¯xed government spending and distortionary taxes following a tax
rule aimed at achieving a ¯xed debt-GDP ratio in the absence of any supply-side shocks.
Section 4 describes a monetary policy game in the context of this multi-country world
of economies each with two parties contesting elections and each subject to a random
symmetric shock. This can be regarded as a generalisation of CLP to include political
uncertainty. Others may prefer to see the model as a generalisation of AG to include
open-economy e®ects. In section 5 we show that, by eliminating political uncertainty, CB
independence for one country alone can result in a lower output variance for that country
and a lower average in°ation (i.e., the free lunch or `gain without pain'). However, as
economies become more open the incentive to engage in surprise in°ation diminishes and
with it the bene¯ts of having an independent CB. Gain without pain is still possible but
now less likely. Section 6 then asks the question: what happens if all countries choose an
independent CB? We establish the `bad news' for central bank independence: as economies
become more integrated and subject to symmetric shocks, and if they all delegate monetary
policy to government independent banks, then Rogo®'s low in°ation, high output variance
trade-o® re-emerges. Section 7 concludes.
2Numerous issues arising from the free lunch hypothesis have been discussed in the literature. Indica-
tively, other explanations of the free lunch `puzzle' include Eij±nger and Hoeberichts (1998) and Hughes
Hallett and Weymark (2002) who discuss the optimal degree of conservativeness of the independent central
banker, and Demertzis et al. (2004) who stress the proactive role of ¯scal policy when faced with rigid
monetary objectives. The above literature suggests that the free lunch result appears in models where
counter-cyclical ¯scal policy and political uncertainty have not been accounted for. It also appears when
preferences (relating to the degree of central banker's conservatism or political parties' preferences for
output stability) are not endogenous.
32 The Evidence
In order to motivate our analysis, this section ¯rst con¯rms the empirical result found
in the literature that central bank independence lowers in°ation without cost in terms of
higher unemployment or output variance.3 We use data on real gross domestic income
from the Penn World Tables and calculate the standard deviation of the series for the
period 1980-1998, which we use as a measure of output variability. We also calculate
the standard deviation of output growth. We regress these on measures of central bank
independence obtained from Cukierman et al. (1992). In addition, we also examine the
cost of delegation in terms of unemployment using data for the same period.4
Consistent with the empirical literature we have not managed to establish at any
meaningful level of signi¯cance that higher degrees of independence are related to higher
unemployment rates or lower and more variable rates of output growth. The data seem to
be in favour of the `free lunch' hypothesis. Estimation results are reported in Table 1 on
the following page.
Our second set of results establish the empirical relevance of open-economy e®ects on
the in°ationary bias.5 Table 2 on page 6 reports the estimated coe±cients of a regression
of in°ation on openness, debt, past in°ation, and a central bank dependence index for
several subsets of countries, including non-OECD economies. We also report the estimated
parameters dropping past in°ation from the speci¯cation.
Our priors are that openness is negatively associated with in°ation, whereas central
bank dependence, the underlying structural or equilibrium unemployment rate and the
debt-GDP ratio have the opposite e®ect. We use past in°ation as a proxy for the equi-
librium unemployment rate. We can see that the coe±cients enter the equation with the
right signs in all sub-samples, except for the coe±cient of past in°ation which has the
wrong sign but is insigni¯cant for the non-OECD countries and for the sample as a whole,
which is dominated by this group. They are also signi¯cant at the 1 percent level in most
cases.6 Estimating the model without past in°ation does not change the results signi¯-
3See Grilli, Masciandaro, Tabellini (1991), Alesina and Summers (1993), and Alesina and Gatti (1995).
4Sources and de¯nitions of the variables used in this section's estimations are reported in the notes of
tables 1, 2 and 3.
5Related cross-countries studies of in°ation are those of Romer (1993), and Campillo and Miron (1996).
6A criticism that is often made on empirical studies supporting the existence of a negative correlation
4Table 1: Central Banks and Stabilization Losses
CBO CBL Constant








Notes. Output data (in natural logarithms) are from the Penn World Table for the period 1980{1998; see Heston
et al. (2002). Unemployment is average unemployment for the same sample period (source: OECD). CBO is an
in°ation-based indicator {see Table 11 in Cukierman et al. (1992){ which is also used in Romer (1993). Note that
it is actually a dependence measure. CBL is Cukierman et al.'s legal central bank independence index. The sample
consists of 24 OECD countries. Estimation method: OLS with robust errors (White estimator). The t-statistics are
in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
cantly except in the case of OECD countries where the coe±cients of debt and openness
lose their signi¯cance.7
The reason for including past in°ation is to proxy for the equilibrium unemployment
rate (although we have noted the alternative explanation of Campillo and Miron (1996)
in footnote 7). We now test directly for this e®ect. We use four observations (1986, 1990,
1995, 1998) on the estimated non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU),
but only for twenty OECD countries (we also carry out the estimation for a smaller sub-
between the degree of CB independence and in°ation is that there may be a two-way causality in the
results. However, Cukierman et al. (1992) ¯nd that two-stage least squares estimation does not a®ect
their results. Using Data on 17 OECD countries, we have also tested for the possibility that it is the
de°atable proportion of debt that creates in°ation, but we ¯nd that it is the total level of debt to GDP
that is in°ationary and not the fraction of it that can be in°ated away. We de¯ne government securities
whose real returns can be eroded by surprise in°ation (mainly nominal debt with maturity over a year) as
de°atable.
7An alternative explanation for the result that average past in°ation is positive and signi¯cant only
for the rich countries is o®ered by Campillo and Miron (1996). They argue that it is possible that high
in°ation induces investments in technologies for avoiding the costs of in°ation. Once these are developed
they are not costly to use, and thus they reduce future aversion to in°ation. Campillo and Miron claim
that such technologies might be easier to develop in high income countries.
5Table 2: Estimated Coe±cients
Variable All OECD Non-OECD EU15
Constant -3.85* -3.84* -5.16* -4.47* -3.35* -3.3* -5.11*
(-19.8) (-19.8) (-28.94) (-14.9) (-10.08) (-10.04) (-56.2)
Openness -1.94* -1.95* -1.23** -0.42 -2.21* -2.21* -1.88*
(-6.7) (-7.6) (-2.01) (-0.9) (-6.63) (-7.51) (-6.89)
Debt 80 0.69* 0.7* 1.21* 0.1 0.72* 0.73* 1.53*
(3.68) (3.7) (3.55) (0.26) (3.38) (3.33) (11.92)
CBO 8.1* 8.1* 8.47* 10.93* 6.22* 5.88* 8.65*
(6.59) (7.62) (9.74) (5.03) (3.28) (3.91) (29.88)
Past In°. -0.09 { 11.71* { -0.15 { 13.15*
(-0.11) { (5.07) { (-0.19) { (7.25)
Adj. R sq. 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.5 0.47 0.49 0.67
F-stat. 20.95 29.35 18.99 8.74 9.44 13.47 10.69
Sample 63 64 24 24 39 40 15
The dependent variable is the log of the average in°ation rate 1980-1998. Openness is the share of imports to GDP
between 1980 and 1998; Debt 80 is the level of government debt as a percentage of GDP in 1980; CBO is the
central bank dependence index developed by Cukierman et al. (1992) for the 1980s; Past in°. is average in°ation
before 1980 (the beginning of the period varies across countries- but for most is early 1950s). The countries in the
sample are those in Cukierman et al. (1992) for which we could obtain data on the rest of the variables. Estimation
method: OLS with robust errors (White estimator). The t-statistic is in parentheses. Superscripts *, ** and ***
denote signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
sample of 13 EU countries, for which data were available). We use the mean of these four
observations as a proxy for structural unemployment over our sample period, and we use
this together with openness, debt, and the central bank index as explanatory variables.
The results of Table 3 show a signi¯cant positive e®ect of NAWRU on the in°ation rate,
and the other variables have the e®ect predicted by our priors. The only quali¯cation is
that for the OECD as a whole, openness although correctly signed is now only signi¯cant
at the 10% level.
Concluding the brief empirical analysis, we have revisited and con¯rmed the cross-
country results of the literature: openness, low debt, low structural unemployment and
central bank independence reduce in°ation.8 The apparent lower in°ation which results
8Note, however, that the results on central bank independence are sensitive to the index used. A caveat
6Table 3: The Role of NAWRU
Constant Openness Debt 80 CBO NAWRU
OECD -4.99* -0.81 0.81** 10.59* 4.7*
(-20.18) (-1.10) (1.95) (13.21) (3.07)
EU -4.68* -1.87* 1.27* 10.68* 3.5*
(-22.9) (-6.3) (6.24) (9.99) (4.6)
Adj. R-sq. 0.66 (OECD) 0.87 (EU) F-stat. 7.2 (OECD) 20.8 (EU)
Sample 20 (OECD) 13 (EU)
Notes. NAWRU is the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (source: Elmeskov and Scarpetta, 1999). Other
variables and estimation method same as in previous tables.
from a higher degree of independence of the monetary authorities does not come at a cost
in terms of higher unemployment and output growth variance. We now develop the theory
that can explain these stylized facts.
3 The Multi-Country Model
The model of output is of a Mundell-Fleming variety in which n + 1 interdependent
economies each specialise in the production of a distinctive composite good. These goods
are imperfect substitutes in consumption. Capital stock and investment are exogenously
¯xed. All economies have identical economic structures, and are subject to a common
supply shock.9
Label the countries with subscripts 0;1;:::;n and drop the subscript for country 0. For
country i let ¼i be CPI in°ation and yi = log(Yi=Y i) ¼ (Yi ¡ Y i)=Y i be the proportional
change in output relative to Y i, the steady-state natural rate path. All variables are dated
at time t, a subscript +1 indicates the date t + 1 and a subscript ¡1 indicates the date
t ¡ 1. Denote CPI in°ation surprise by ~ ¼i = ¼i ¡ E¡1(¼i). Then the reduced form of
the model employed in the paper is given by an output equation for country 0, expressed
should also be issued that measurements of independence are somewhat dated. Even though one would
not expect the institutional frameworks underlying the operation of central banks to change frequently, it
needs to be mentioned that the index used may not represent the current status of all central banks in the
sample.
9We ignore other shocks such as that to the government spending-GDP ratio.
7in terms of in°ation targets and tax rates, a debt accumulation identity and a tax rule.
Output is given by





»~ ¼i ¡ ² (1)
where Á 2 [0;1] is a parameter such that 1 ¡ Á expresses the degree of openness of the
economies and measures the impact of a domestic in°ation surprise on domestic output,
¿v; ¿w are output and income tax rates respectively and ² is a supply shock. Analogous
output equations apply to countries i = 1;¢ ¢ n. Appendix A derives (1) from micro-
foundations, but a more traditional formulation would lead to the same basic structure.
The advantage of our treatment is that the parameters Á and » can be expressed in terms
of the underlying fundamental parameters and observed macro-economic variables; i.e.
Á =
® + °2»
® + (n + 1)°2»
; » = (1 ¡ ¯)=¯ (2)
where ® = (C=Y )=(1 ¡ G=Y ), C=Y and G=Y are consumption and government spending
expressed as proportions of baseline output respectively, ¯ is capital's share of output,
°2 is a consumer preference parameter for imported private (non-government) goods such
that n°2 is the share of these goods in total consumption.
The mechanism through which the inter-country spillover e®ects in (1) occur is through
surprise real exchange e®ects. A relative in°ation surprise in country 0 causes a surprise
real depreciation for country 0 relative to i. For country i this is real appreciation which
in turn lowers the cost of imported goods and causes its real product wage to fall. Thus
a unilateral monetary expansion in the domestic country boosts foreign employment and
output. This policy spillover plays a central role in the monetary policy game that follows.




(1 ¡ m~ ¼)d ¡ ¿ + G=Y (3)
where d is the beginning-of-period debt/GDP ratio, R and g are the expected real interest
and GDP growth rates respectively, m is the proportion of de°atable debt and ¿ = ¿v+¿w
is the total tax rate (assuming income and output tax are the sole sources of tax revenue).
The model is completed with a ¯scal rule rule






(1 ¡ m~ ¼)d ¼ G=Y + (R ¡ g)(1 ¡ m~ ¼)d (4)
¿w = E¡1(¿w) (5)
8for small R and g. According to (5), the income tax rate is set one period ahead and
from (4) the other tax rate, ¿v, and government spending adjust in the current period to
stabilize the current level of government debt.10 This `Ricardian' ¯scal rule11 implies that
(3) becomes
d+1 = (1 ¡ m~ ¼)d (6)
Thus taking expectations at the beginning of the period before the shock is observed, we
have that E(d+1) = d.12 In the absence of any in°ation surprise the debt/GDP ratio is
¯xed. Expressing the tax rate and all variables in deviation form about the zero-in°ation
steady state and substituting into (1), output in country 0 in deviation form becomes





»~ ¼i ¡ ² (7)
where ¹ R is the steady state value of R. (7) forms the basis for our subsequent analysis.
The main aim of the paper is to contrast the results for a closed economy of AG with
those for an increasingly integrated world economy. This contrast is facilitated by allowing
the consumer preference parameter °2 to vary between °2 = 0 to the opposite extreme
of perfect integration (or `single market'), °2 = 1=(n + 1), where all private goods enter
equally into the consumption basket. Corresponding variations in the openness parameter
1¡Á are then given in a useful lemma given in Appendix B which is used at various points
in the subsequent analysis.
10Fiscal policy plays no direct role in stabilizing output.
11Such a tax rule implies a \consistent and conventional theory of the price level" {see Buiter (2005).
Fiscal policy plays no direct role in stabilizing output. The particular form of the rule is chosen to make
the analysis tractable. It implies that the variance of the primary surplus is small compared with d (since
the primary surplus ¿ ¡
G
Y ' ±d, where ± < 1 is the representative household's rate of time preference).
However, it also implies that the variance of relative primary surpluses between countries equals that of
debt-GDP ratios, which is not borne out by the data.
12See also Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998, 2003).
94 Political Uncertainty and Stabilization in the Open Econ-
omy
4.1 The Setup of the Game
We consider a world of n + 1 identical interdependent economies. Output in country 0
is described by (1) and analogous equations describe output in the other countries. Re-
introducing the time subscript for the moment, we assume that monetary authority i at









i¿ + bi(yi¿ ¡ ^ y)2] (8)
where ± is both the authority's and the consumers' rate of time discount. Equation (8)
says that the monetary authority has a bliss point at zero in°ation and at an output level
^ y relative to the baseline equilibrium rate which is thus assumed to be socially suboptimal.
The in°ation rate is the assumed monetary instrument. This can be regarded as in°ation
targets set by the CB and achieved without error. Random (but not systematic) monetary
control errors can be easily introduced without changing anything of substance in the
analysis.13
In the analysis of this section country 0 is assumed to have an independent CB with
a degree of conservatism b = b0. The remaining n CBs are not independent and have
preferences described by bi = bL if the `Left' are in power and bi = bR if the `Right' are in
o±ce where b · bR < bL. In each period there is an exogenous probability p, of a Right
government being elected and a probability (1 ¡ p) of a Left government being elected.
For large n these are also the approximate proportions of Right and Left governments.14
The sequencing of events is as follows:
Event 1. In the initial period t = 0 the CB in country 0 is appointed with a preference
13Thus the CBs are both instrument- and goal-independent, unlike the BoE which is only instrument-
independent.
14The assumption of a constant and exogenous probability of winning, a standard one in the
partisan political economy literature. Notice that it is the assumption about the current and fu-
ture elections that matters in this model. The assumption says that prob(Reagan wins in 84) =
prob(all future Right governments win) = p with this probability formed in 84. An important future
challenge for partisan political models is to allow for the endogeneity of the outcome of elections whilst
maintaining the tractability of the analysis.
10b0 = b. Government 0 is committed to this choice in all future periods.
Event 2. Fiscal policy is set consisting of the tax rule (4) and a constant proportion of
de°atable debt m. Initial debt and m is the same for all countries.
Event 3. In each country nominal wages are set based on expected in°ation next period.
Event 4. The governments determining monetary policy in countries 1 to n are elected.
Event 5. The common supply shock occurs in each economy.
Event 6. The CBs independently and simultaneously set in°ation in response to obser-
vations of the shock.
4.2 The Equilibrium
We now solve the game from event 2 onwards, that is treating the choice of conservatism
at event 1 as exogenous. Proceeding by backwards induction at event 6, using (6) the
e®ect of unilateral in°ation surprises, ~ ¼, in country 0 at time 0, ~ ¼1 at time 1, ~ ¼2 at
time 2 etc is make the debt/GDP ratio to accumulate according to: d1 = (1 ¡ m~ ¼)d,
d2 = (1¡m~ ¼1)(1¡m~ ¼)d ¼ (1¡m~ ¼1 ¡m~ ¼)d etc, in the vicinity of a zero-in°ation steady
state.15 From (7) we therefore have
y+1 = »(Á + ( ¹ R ¡ g)md+1)~ ¼+1 ¡ ²+1 + spillovers (9)
where, using (6), the ¯rst term in (9) can be written »(Á +( ¹ R ¡ g)md)~ ¼+1 plus a second-
order term in ~ ¼~ ¼+1. Minimizing E¡1(L) = ¼2 +b(y ¡ ^ y)2 + 1
1+±E(¼2
+1 +b(y+1 ¡ ^ y)2)+¢¢¢,
we now can see that the contributions to the expected losses in the future are independent
of the current in°ation rate ~ ¼. Therefore in a discretionary equilibrium, the ¯rst order
condition with respect to ¼ given future in°ation rates and all expectations including E¡1¼
(and recalling that ~ ¼ = ¼ ¡ E¡1¼) is simply
¼ + b»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ g)md](y ¡ ^ y) = 0 (10)
Thus, with our assumed ¯scal rule and the debt dynamics that follow from it a potentially
intertemporal and intractable optimization problem reduces to a tractable single-period
one. Equation (10) applies to country 0 with an independent central bank. Applying
15Following much of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) literature we linearize in the
vicinity of a zero-in°ation steady state. See Appendix A for full details.
11analogous reasoning to the other countries with non-independent central banks, we arrive
at the ¯rst order conditions for countries 1; 2;:::;n:
¼R + bR»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ g)md](yR ¡ ^ y) = 0
¼L + bL»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ g)md](yL ¡ ^ y) = 0 (11)
where (11) applies to np Right and n(1 ¡ p) Left administrations respectively.
We now decompose the in°ation rates into two parts: an in°ation bias ¹ ¼i which depends
on the type of monetary authority and beginning-of-period debt, and a term ~ ¼ which is
dependent on the current observed shock. Corresponding to this composition we write
yi = ¹ yi + ~ yi; i = 0;1;¢ ¢ n. We ¯rst solve for the in°ation bias and equilibrium non-shock
contingent output. At event 3 of the game expectations are given by
E¡1(¼) = ¹ ¼; E¡1(¼i) = p¹ ¼R + (1 ¡ p)¹ ¼L); i = 1;2;¢ ¢ n (12)
where from (10) and (11) we have
¹ ¼ + b»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ ¹ g)md](¹ y ¡ ^ y) = 0 (13)
¹ ¼R + bR»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ ¹ g)md](¹ yR ¡ ^ y) = 0 (14)
¹ ¼L + bL»[Á + ( ¹ R ¡ ¹ g)md](¹ yL ¡ ^ y) = 0 (15)






[¼i ¡ E¡1(¼i)] = n[p~ ¼R + (1 ¡ p)~ ¼L] (16)
where ~ ¼R = ¼R¡E¡1(¼R) and ~ ¼L = ¼L¡E¡1(¼L). Hence using (1) we have that E¡1(y) = 0.
Then noting that the Ramsey-Keynes rule implies that ¹ R ¡ ¹ g = ± (see Appendix A), and
using the ¯rst order condition (12) for country 0 we arrive at
¹ y = 0; ¹ ¼ = b»(Á + ±md)^ y (17)
Thus in the absence of an exogenous shock, for country 0 with an independent CB there
is no political uncertainty. Output always remains at its natural rate and the in°ation
bias depends only on the beginning-of-period debt/GDP ratio and is not a®ected by the
political uncertainty in the rest of the world.
12For countries 1 to n with government-dependent CBs, from (1) with ¹ R¡g = ±, output
in countries with a Right government is given by




[¼ ¡ E¡1 (¼) + (np ¡ 1)(¼R ¡ E¡1 (¼i)) + n(1 ¡ p)(¼R ¡ E¡1 (¼i))] ¡ ² (18)
Hence using (12) we have
yR = ¡»(1 ¡ p)
·




(¼L ¡ ¼R) (19)





(¼L ¡ ¼R) for Left governments. These two
results together with (14) and (15) give us four equations for yR; yL; ¼R; and ¼L. Solving
we arrive at








yR = ¡(1 ¡ p)µ(bL ¡ bR)»2b y=¢ (22)






[Á + ±md] and ¢ = 1 + µ[(1 ¡ p)bR + pbL]»2 . From the
lemma (ii) in section 3 we have that µ > 0. It is then straightforward to show that
corresponding to bL > bR > b we must have ¼L > ¼R > ¼ and that yL ¸ 0 and yR · 0;
that is the election of Left (Right) government results in output rising above (below) its
natural rate. For a single closed economy we put Á = 1 and all the results above reduce to
those in the closed-economy partisan political monetary cycle literature. If elections are
predictable at the time wages are set, then if p = 1, ¢ = 1 + µbl»2, ¼R = bR (Á + ±md)»b y
with output at its natural rate. Similarly if p=0, ¼L = bL (Á + ±md)»b y and output, again,
is at its natural rate. The main results up to this point are summarised as:
Proposition 1. Assuming weights bL > bR > b for a Left government-dependent CB, a
Right government-dependent CB and an independent CB respectively, the corresponding
in°ation biases and output, in the absence of shocks, satisfy ¼L > ¼R ¸ ¼, y = 0, yR · 0
and yL ¸ 0.
These results reduce to those in the partisan political business cycle literature for
closed economies, and AG in particular. Our results also reduce to those in CLP for the
13open economy but without political business cycles. Given the in°ation of other countries,
our model predicts that the in°ationary bias increases with openness, 1¡Á, the in°atable
debt-GDP ratio, md, central bank dependence, the conservativeness of the independent
central bankers, 1=b, and the bliss level of output relative to the equilibrium level which
is approximately equal to the equilibrium unemployment rate, all consistent with the
empirical evidence.
The open-economy e®ect on the in°ationary bias is illustrated in Figure 1 on the
following page which compares the in°ation bias in the single open economy with that
under the closed economy where Á = 1. In employment-in°ation space, since output in
logarithms is proportional to employment in logarithms, we can see from (1) that the short-
run Phillips Curve (SRPC) is steeper in the open-economy case. Given expectations, the
policymaker chooses an indi®erence curve as close possible to the full-employment, zero
in°ation bliss point at B at C0 and C for the closed- and open-economy cases respectively.
The rational expectations equilibria are on the vertical long-run Phillips Curve (LRPC) at
D0 and D respectively. Thus openness reduces the in°ationary bias from PD0 to PD. If
countries choose and are able to credibly cooperate, then this is equivalent to proceeding
from the open- to closed-economy and the in°ationary bias increases. This is an example
of counterproductive cooperation ¯rst pointed out by Rogo® (1985a).
5 The Free Lunch (Gain without Pain) Explained
5.1 The Gain
The political gain from an independent CB, apart from a lower in°ation bias, is the
elimination of the output variance caused only by political uncertainty (PG). Thus PG
is given by
PG = p[yR ¡ E (yi)]
2 + (1 ¡ p)[yL ¡ E (yi)]
2 (24)
= p(1 ¡ p)(yL ¡ yR)
2 = p(1 ¡ p)»4µ2 (bL ¡ bR)
2 b y2=¢
using (12) and the results above for yL and yR. How is the gain PG from eliminating
political uncertainty a®ected by the degree of global integration? The latter is captured
by 1¡Á which from the lemma (iii) increases if either the consumer preference parameter









Figure 1: The In°ation Bias in the Open Economy: Cooperation and Non-Cooperation
from the lemma (iii) we can show that µ =
h
(n+1)Á¡1
n + (1 + ±)md
i
[Á + (1 + ±)md] is a
decreasing function of °2 and n. Since PG increases with µ we arrive at the proposition:
Proposition 2. Global integration reduces the output variance caused solely by political
uncertainty.
The intuition behind this result follows from the previous insight that openness creates
a disincentive to in°ate because the boost to output caused by surprise in°ation is partially
o®set by a real depreciation. As a result the increase (decrease) in output as a result of
the election of a Left (Right) government falls and with it the output variance PG, given
by (24) induced by political uncertainty.
5.2 The Pain
Now consider the downside, the `pain' from CBI in the form of a stabilization loss. In order
to simplify the subsequent analysis, we ignore debt (or, equivalently, assume that all debt
is non-de°atable, i.e., m = 0). To ¯nd the stabilization loss, we need the shock-contingent
components of in°ation rates and output. From (10) and (11) these satisfy the ¯rst order
15conditions
e ¼ + bÁ»e y = 0 (25)
e ¼R + bRÁ»e yR = 0 (26)
e ¼L + bLÁ»e yL = 0 (27)
for the independent CB, the np Right government-dependent CBs and the n(1 ¡ p) Left
government-dependent CBs respectively. From (1) we have
e y = Á»e ¼ + (1 ¡ Á)» [pe ¼R + (1 ¡ p)e ¼L] ¡ ² (28)
e yR = Á»e ¼R +
(1 ¡ Á)
n
» [(np ¡ 1)e ¼R + n(1 ¡ p)e ¼L + e ¼] ¡ ² (29)
e yL = Á»e ¼L +
(1 ¡ Á)
n
» [(np ¡ 1)e ¼L + n(1 ¡ p)e ¼R + e ¼] ¡ ² (30)




²=©; yL = ¡
¡
1 + µb»2¢
























There are two possible ways of measuring the gain in terms of lower output variance
from having an independent CB. The ¯rst, which we examine in this section, is to compare
the output variance from having a single independent CB with that of the remaining n
countries with government-dependent CBs. This is not strictly the gain from the change
in regime, but it does indicate observed di®erences which feature in the empirical section.
The actual gain from the regime shift, examined in the next section, is the di®erence
between the output variance of a country before and after it unilaterally makes its own
CB government-independent. This is an indication of the incentive for an individual
country to make this institutional change.
Gain without pain occurs in the ¯rst sense i® var(y) · var(yi); i = 1;:::;n. Since
the two forms of uncertainty are independent the output variance for countries with
government-dependent CBs decomposes into a political induced part PG obtained above,
and a shock-induced component given by pE¡1 (e yR)
2 + (1 ¡ p)E¡1 (e yL)
2. Since var(e y) =
E¡1 (e y)
2 the condition for gain without pain becomes PG > SL where SL is the stabiliza-
tion loss given by
SL =
h¡
1 + µbL»2¢2 ¡
¡
1 + µb»2¢2 ¡













‘Very conservative’ independent central banker
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Figure 2: The Lower Output Variance Gain and Loss for a Single Independent CB Relative
to n Others.













Hence since bL > b we must have that SL > 0. Thus we have the proposition:
Proposition 3. In the open economy SL > 0; i.e. there is always some stabilization loss
for the single independent CB.
Thus the free-rider e®ect can never be su±cient to totally eliminate the stabilization
loss caused by a single independent CB. Unlike the political gain PG we cannot sign SL
unambiguously as integration increases. This is because there are two opposite e®ects
operating. As integration increases, the spillover e®ect of a given monetary expansion
(for a common negative supply-side shock) from the n government-dependent CBs on
the single independent CB increases. However integration also reduces the size of their
expansion because they will be deterred by an increased exchange rate depreciation. We
can see this ambiguity in some numerical results shown in ¯gure 2. Figure 2 plots PG
and SL against the proportion n°2 of imported goods entering the consumption basket
which we refer to as the degree of integration.16 As economies move from autarky to
complete integration, where there is no bias towards the domestic good, then this portion
increases through the range n°2 2 [0;n=(n + 1)]. We examine a ¯ve-country trading bloc
closed to the outside world (i.e. n = 4) and set the fundamental parameters bL; b y; ¾²; ¯;
®; and md to reproduce observed behaviour in typical OECD countries. Appendix C on
page 25 gives full details of this calibration. The remaining parameters are b and bR. We
16Note from the Lemma, part (iii), that openness 1 ¡ Á increases with integration n°2
17set bR = bL=2 and examine two cases: b = bR and b = bR=2 corresponding to conservative
and very conservative independent central bankers.
With our calibration in the case of autarky at °2 = 0 (corresponding to AG) the
gain PG from independent CBs in terms of less politically induced output variance by far
outweighs the stabilization loss SL. As economies begin to trade PG falls as required by
proposition 2. The stabilization loss remains quite °at for the less conservative bankers
but falls if bankers are very conservative. In the former case we still see gain without
pain at high levels of integration; in the latter case CB independence results in higher
output variance as economies begin to import around half their consumption needs. The
main message from these results is that open-economy e®ects can drastically alter the
balance between the gain from a reduction in political uncertainty, and the stabilization
loss resulting from the appointment of an independent central banker in one country.
6 The Sting in the Tail: The Bad News for Central Bank
Independence
We now address the question of what happens when all countries adopt independent
CBs. We measure the gains or otherwise relative to the equilibrium where all CBs are
government-dependent. If we put bR = bL = b in the results of section 3 we in e®ect
eliminate political uncertainty and arrive at the equilibrium with n+1 independent CBs.
Using the previous results we ¯nd that





which reduce to results obtained in CLP. We can now show that var(e y) increases as we
proceed from one independent CB to n+1 independent CBs; i.e., we have the proposition:
Proposition 4. The stabilization loss associated with central bank independence increases
as we proceed from one to n + 1 independent CBs.
Proof: See Appendix D
Now let us compare the output variance for the two scenarios of proposition 4 with that for
n+1 government-dependent CBs. For the latter the ¯rst order conditions and expectations
18remain as before; that is (11) and (13) respectively. Output for a Right government is:




[((n + 1)p ¡ 1)(¼R ¡ E (¼i)) + (n + 1)(1 ¡ p)(¼R ¡ E (¼i))] ¡ ² (34)
Using (13) we ¯nd that yR; yL; ¼R; and ¼R are as before and therefore output variance
induced by political uncertainty is unchanged.
Turning to the shock-contingent component of output, ¯rst order conditions (25) are
as before but now
e yR = »Áe ¼R +
(1 ¡ Á)»
n
[((n + 1)p ¡ 1)e ¼R + (n + 1)(1 ¡ p)e ¼L] ¡ ² (35)
e yL = »Áe ¼L +
(1 ¡ Á)»
n
[((n + 1)(1 ¡ p) ¡ 1)e ¼L + (n + 1)pe ¼R] ¡ ² (36)
replace (29) and (30). Solving our four equations in e ¼R; e ¼L; e yR; and e yL gives
e yL = ¡²=¡; e yR = ¡£²=¡ (37)
where ¡ = 1+µbL»2 + n+1
n [pbR£ + (1 ¡ p)bL]»2Á(1 ¡ Á), and £ > 1 is de¯ned as before.
The stabilization loss from central bank independence is now measured as:
SL = var(e y) ¡ pvar(e yR) ¡ (1 ¡ p)var(e yL) (38)
where SL = SL(one) for the case of one independent CB when is given by (32), obtained
before, and L = L(all) for the case of n + 1 independent CBs in which case e y is given by
(33).
Figure 3 on the following page shows PG (which is unchanged), SL(one) and SL(all)
plotted against n°2. From proposition 4 we know that SL(all) > SL(one) and this is
con¯rmed by our numerical results. Our results indicate that `gain without pain' when
one country unilaterally appoints an independent CB can give way to a signi¯cant out-
put volatility loss when all countries join the Rogo® delegation game. This delegation
equilibrium for our identical economies requires that all countries do delegate and choose
identical degrees of conservatism b at event 1 of the game. The full delegation game with
the endogenous determination of b is examined in CLP for the case of monetary policy
alone and in Levine and Pearlman (1997) with monetary and ¯scal policy interactions, but
in the absence of political uncertainty. Full examination of the full delegation equilibrium
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Figure 3: The Lower Output Variance Gain, PG, and Loss for One Independent CB,
SL(one), and n + 1 Independent CBs, SL(all), Relative to n +1 Government-Dependent
CBs
7 Conclusions
Our brief survey of the theoretical literature in the introduction suggests four possible
explanations for the apparent result that CB independence achieves lower in°ation at no
cost in terms of greater employment or output variability: we are a observing a trigger
strategy equilibrium, Walsh-type contracts are at work, the Rogo®-delegation game is
being played with either political uncertainty as in AG or with open-economy e®ects as
in CLP. This paper focuses on the latter two more plausible explanations and provides a
synthesis.
We ¯nd that open-economy e®ects signi¯cantly alter the results of AG and the ef-
fectiveness of Rogo®-style delegation to independent central banks. Whilst the positive
conclusions are the same - the model is still consistent with the empirical ¯ndings of gain
without pain - the normative conclusions to be drawn are quite di®erent. Our results in-
dicate that as more CBs become independent and economies become more integrated17 A
footnote has been added in the conclusions to this e®ect. then Rogo®'s trade-o® between
low in°ation and high output variance re-emerges. The policy implication of these ¯nd-
ings is that alternatives to Rogo®-delegation discussed in the introduction, such as Walsh
17We focus on only some aspects of integration, namely those associated with a decreasing consumer
bias for the home-produced good and an increase in trading partners. Other aspects of integration arising
from, for example, more capital mobility would require a major reworking of our Keynesian short-run
model with exogenous capital.
20contracts that will enforce the ¯rst-best (or near-¯rst best) monetary policy rules, may
become increasingly attractive as the global integration of the world economy increases.
A Derivation of Equation (1)
The Demand Side
In country i, i = 0;j, Cij units of good j are imported from country j, j = 0;:::;n. All
variables are dated at time t, a subscript +1 indicates the date t + 1 and a subscript
¡1 indicates the date t ¡ 1. Given total consumption consumers in country i choose to




°ij logCij + ´iG;
n X
j=0
°ij = 1 (A.1)
subject to Ci =
Pn
j=0 EijCij, where Gi is the exogenous government-provided good, as-
sumed to exist solely of the domestic good (i.e. is non-traded), and Eij is the real exchange
rate between country i and j; that is, the price of good j in units of good i. Standard
analysis gives
Cij = °ijCi=Eij (A.2)
It follows that the demand for the output of country i from consumers in country j
is Cji = °jiCj=Eji = °jiCjEij. With our logarithmic utility function (A.1), °ij thus
turns out to be the share of good j in the consumption of the representative consumer in
country i. We make the following assumptions about °ij. For the consumer in country
i no one imported good is preferred from countries j = 0;¢ ¢ n; j 6= i; but the domestic
good may be preferred to any foreign good. This may be interpreted as the result of a
private non-traded sector (in addition to the government non-traded sector), or the idea
that domestic producers can establish a special relationship with domestic consumers.
Otherwise consumer preferences are identical in each country. To summarize:
°ii = ° ; °ij = (1 ¡ °1)=n = °2 ; °1 ¸ ° (A.3)









CjEij + Ii + Gi (A.4)
21where Ii is exogenous private investment (note that Eii = 1). Now express all exchange
rates relative to country 0; i.e., put Eij = Ei0=Ej0 = E0j=E0i = Ej=Ei, dropping the
country 0 subscript for notational convenience. Then for country 0 (A.4) is written simply
as





CjEj + I + G (A.5)
The demand side of the model is not complete as we still need to determine total con-
sumption; but we return to this closure later.
The Supply Side
The supply side is institutional in character. The representative wage-setter in country
0 has a target real disposable wage and, at time t ¡ 1, sets the one-period nominal wage
contract for time t to minimize an expected welfare loss E¡1(U) where
U = (w(1 ¡ ¿w) ¡ pc ¡ ^ w)2 (A.6)
All variables in (A.6) are now expressed in logarithms apart from ¿w, the income tax
rate. w = logW is the log of nominal wage, W; the consumer price index (CPI) is
pc = p + °2(e1 + e2 + ¢ ¢ +en), where p is the log of the domestic price level, °2 has
been identi¯ed as the share of each foreign good in consumption, ei is the log of the real




¡1( ¹ AL)1¡¯ exp(¡u) (A.7)
where K¡1 is the exogenous end-of-period t ¡ 1 capital stock, ¹ AL are e®ective units of
labour, ¹ A is human capital growing at an exogenous rate equal to the per capita GDP
growth rate in a balanced-growth steady state, and u is an i.i.d mean zero negative output
shock, the supply shock in the model. The representative ¯rm maximizes post-tax pro¯ts
(1¡¿v)PY ¡WL, where ¿v is an output tax rate paid by ¯rms18 giving a labour demand
relationship
w ¡ p = f(K¡1; ^ A) ¡ ¯l ¡ ¿v ¡ u (A.8)
18We interpret output tax as VAT and any other tax levied on ¯rms, expressed as a proportion of total
revenue. This enables us to justify using this tax as a stabilization instrument responding automatically
to changes in debt and in°ation according to (4).
22where f(K¡1; ^ A) = log(1 ¡ ¯) + (1 ¡ ¯)log ¹ A + ¯ logK¡1 and we have approximated
log(1 ¡ ¿v) ¼ ¡¿v. The nominal wage, is found by minimizing (A.6) with respect to w
subject to (A.8). Performing this optimization we arrive at







A + E¡1(¿w) + ^ w (A.9)
Combining (A.8) and (A.9)we arrive at
l = ¹ l + fpc ¡ E¡1(pc) ¡ °2
n X
j=0
[ej ¡ E¡1(ej) + E¡1(ej)] ¡ E¡1(¿w) ¡ ¿vg=¯ ¡ ² (A.10)
where ² = u=¯ and equilibrium employment is given by ¹ l = [f(K¡1;A) ¡ ^ w]=¯.
The second term in (A.10) is the familiar e®ect of a CPI price surprise on employment.
The next two terms are open-economy e®ects. An imported content in the consumption
basket (°2 > 0) means that for a given credible consumer price target (i.e., pc = E¡1(pc))
an unexpected real exchange rate appreciation enables the monetary authority to ac-
commodate a surprise in the domestic price level, reducing the real product wage and
increasing employment. The third term, which disappears in the rational expectations
solution below, arises because an anticipated real exchange rate appreciation lowers the
real product wage.














(1 + Ri) ¡ (1 + R)
¸¶
= 0 (A.12)
(A.11) is the stochastic `Keynes-Ramsey Rule' where R is the real interest rate in country
0, Ri in country i and ± is the representative consumer's rate of time preference. (A.12)
can be obtained by maximising the expectations of (A.1) subject to a consumers' budget
constraint. (A.12) equates (A.11) with an equivalent ¯rst order condition if the consumer
keeps her wealth in foreign bonds. Equations (A.5), (A.7), (A.10), (A.11), (A.12) and
their foreign counterparts give us 4(n+1)+n equations to determine the same number of
macro-variables fCi;Yi;Li;Rig;i = 0;¢ ¢ n; fEig;i = 1;¢ ¢ n, given expectations and given
the CPI and level of government spending in each country.
The Rational Expectations Solution
23Let ¼ = pc ¡ E¡1(pc) be CPI in°ation in country 0. We now express all variables as
deviations about a baseline path consisting of the deterministic balanced-growth steady-
state of the model.19 In this baseline in°ation rates are set at zero. Denote a country 0
CPI in°ation surprise by ~ ¼¡E¡1(¼) and similarly de¯ne surprises for other variables. The
real exchange rate between country i and country 0 in linear-deviation form is denoted by
ei and that between country j and country i is therefore ej ¡ ei. The country 0 model,
linearized about a zero-in°ation balanced trade and balanced growth steady state, is then




[~ ¼ ¡ °2(~ e1 + ¢ ¢ +~ en) ¡ °2E¡1(e1 + ¢ ¢ +en)] ¡ ² (A.14)
E¡1(c+1) = c + r=(1 + R) (A.15)
E¡1(ei;+1) = ei + (r ¡ ri)=(1 + R) (A.16)
(A.13) is (A.5) in linearized form. (A.14) is the open-economy Lucas supply curve obtained
from (A.10) and using y = (1¡¯)l¡¯². (A.15) and (A.16) are linearized forms of (A.11)
and (A.16) respectively. The full information rational expectations solution follows by
combining (A.15), its country i counterpart, and (A.16) to obtain E¡1(c ¡ ci ¡ ei) =
c¡1 ¡ ci;¡1 ¡ ei;¡1 for which the saddlepath stable solution is c = ci + ei. Then equating
demand and supply in the domestic country and foreign country and taking expectations
of y ¡ yi we have E¡1(ei) = 0 and
ei ¡ E¡1(ei) = ~ ei = ei =
»(~ ¼ ¡ ~ ¼i) ¡ ² + ²i
® + (n + 1)°2(1 ¡ ¯)=¯
(A.17)
where ® and » are de¯ned in (2). Substituting (A.17) into (A.14) gives (1).
B Lemma Relating Integration and Openness
(i) Corresponding to the extremes of perfect integration and autarky we have
®(n + 1) + »
(n + 1)(® + »)
< Á < 1 (B.18)
(ii) It follows from (B.18) that (n + 1)Á > 1.





19Lower case variables denote proportional change relative to the steady state. For example, c =
log(C= ¹ C) ¼ (C ¡ ¹ C)= ¹ C where ¹ C is the steady-state path. Note that in the steady state
1+ ¹ R
1+± = 1 + ¹ g. For
small ¹ R and ¹ g we use the approximation
1+ ¹ R
1+± ¼ 1 + ¹ R ¡ ±; i.e., ¹ R ¡ ± ¼ ¹ g.
24The left-hand-side (LHS) of (B.18) is the upper bound of openness, 1¡Á at the extreme
of perfect integration. Result (ii) immediately follows from this and (iii) says that openness
increases with the number of countries n + 1 and the consumer preference for imported
goods parameter, °2.
C Calibration of Model
We have chosen parameter values to be based as far as possible on a representative world
(i.e., OECD) economy. We choose n + 1 = 5 which can be thought of as representing
the EU without EMU or a world trading system consisting of 5 regions: the EU (with
EMU), US, Japan, the rest of Asia, and the former Soviet Union. We choose a NAIRU,
^ l = 5 so that with ¯ = 0:3, ^ y = (1 ¡ ¯)^ l = 3:5. We calibrate the weight bL to give an
annual in°ation rate of ¼L = 5 at a baseline degree of integration where economies import
half their private consumption goods (i.e., n°2 = 0:5). A choice ¾u = var(u) = 1:5 for
the original supply shock in (A.7) with government dependent CBs leads to an output
variance of 2.5 which corresponds to empirical estimates. Other details of the calibration
are ¹ C=¹ Y = 0:6, ¹ G=¹ Y = 0:6. For these calculations, md = 0 is assumed.
D Proof of Proposition 4
We wish to show that var(e y) with e y given by (33) for the case when all CBs are indepen-







Using the de¯nition of © after (31) we can rearrange the expression to give
© = (1 + b»2Á2)(1 + bL»2µ) + Á(1 ¡ Á)»2[(1 + b»2µ)(p£bR + (1 ¡ p)bL) ¡ b(1 + bL»2µ)]















< bL since bR < bL.
It follows that the LHS is a decreasing function of p. Therefore if (D.20) holds at p=1 it









is true since we assume that bR > b.
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